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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Respondent concurs in the jurisdictional statement of the
Appellant in the Appellant's brief.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The STATEMENT OF FACTS have been arranged in such a way as to
follow the outline of the FINDINGS OF FACT since the FINDINGS OF
FACT has been brought into question.1

The Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law are attached as Addendum #5.
RON HORTON is a musician.

He received his music degree in

violin performance at the University of Utah.

At the time of the

trial he was had been a member of the Utah Symphony, Music Director
at Ballet West, and Music
Orchestra of Ecuador.
Tabernacle Choir.

Director of the National

Symphony

In addition he did recordings with the

Transcript at 25-26, 33.

FINDING NO. 1;

RON HORTON had an auto accident in December

1983 and suffered injuries.

The pain from the auto accident was

such that it brought his consulting career to a halt.
at 26, 33 & 34.

The following abbreviations are used throughout: The Record on Appeal, as paginated by the
Third District Court Clerk, is designated "R";
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
entered by the Lower Court on March 6, 1989,
are designated "Findings" or "Conclusions"; the
trial exhibits are designated as "Exhibit
";
transcript pages will be cited as "Transcript
at
".
1

Transcript

FINDING NO. 2:

In September of 1984 after the accident, Mr.

HORTON took a position teaching violin at the violin making school
Peter Paul Prier which was a modest position for him, but all he
could handle because of the health problems that lingered from the
auto accident.

He was employed on a normal school year from

September to June and was on a monthly salary of $850 per month.
He was not asked to keep track of his hours nor did anyone else at
his employer's keep track of his hours. He was to teach violin to
the students and take whatever time was needed.
full-time employee.
month.

He was paid as a

He calculated he worked 28-1/2 hours per

Transcript at 35-38, 51, 55, 98, Addendum 3.

FINDING NO. 3; RON HORTON signed up for group health and life
insurance with the Defendant on November 1, 1984.
40.

Transcript at

RON HORTON told the agent for GEM STATE who sold the policy

to Peter Paul Prier, when he signed up, that he had been injured
in a previous accident and he needed future physical therapy and
medical treatment. He was reassured that he would be covered after
the 9-month waiting period had expired.

Transcript at 51.

Mr.

HORTON indicated to the agent his duties and that he was working
on a school year basis and paid a monthly salary.

Transcript at

41.
RON HORTON

did

not ever see the booklet

Inter-mountain

Employers Trust Cost Savers Flex-Med Comprehensive Major Medical
Benefit Description booklet.

(Exhibit 35)

Transcript at 41.

Mr. HORTON entered the Pain Clinic at the University of Utah
Medical Center on February 16, 1986. The Pain Clinic contacted the
2

Defendant GEM STATE and obtained pre-authorization to admit RON
HORTON and received a letter from GEM STATE authorizing payment for
50 percent of the Pain Clinic's bills for RON HORTON.

Transcript

at 58/ 60/ 66; Addendum 1. His attending physician said Mr. HORTON
was a 1 on a scale of 10 (a 10 being normal) and was very seriously
debilitated from the pain from the accident.

Transcript at 64.

In the Pain Clinic, Mr. HORTON improved dramatically.

Transcript

at 68. His medical bills at the Pain Clinic totalled $13,633.600.
The portion

of which GEM STATE was responsible for was $8,254.80.

(Statement of Facts of the Defendant GEM STATE #18).
FINDING NO. 4;
FINDING

NO.

Statement of Facts GEM STATE #4.

5:

GEM

STATE

treatment in the Pain Clinic.

pre-authorized

RON

Transcript at 60-66.

HORTON1s

Addendum l.

On June 3, 1986, GEM STATE reversed itself and told Plaintiff that
the Pain Clinic expenses were not a covered expense.

Addendum 4.

Shirley Sunderlund who had been with GEM STATE 14 years and
oversees the claims department was claims manager for GEM STATE in
1986. She is familiar with Pain Clinic claims. She was aware that
the letter was sent out pre-authorizing RON HORTON1s claims and did
not dispute that the letter was a GEM STATE document and was sent
to the Pain Clinic.

She testified that there is no question that

the letter was sent out saying GEM STATE had pre-authorized the
expense.

Transcript at 368-381, Addendum 1.

FINDING NO. 6:

Addendum 4.

FINDING NO. 7:

Statement of Pacts GEM STATE #8.

3

FINDING NO, 8: On May 14, 1986, Peter Paul Prier wrote to GEM
STATE advising GEM STATE that RON HORTON was employed and was on
a monthly salary.

Addendum 2.

FINDING NO. 9:

two

Addendum 3.

FINDING NO. 10;

Statement of Facts GEM STATE #11.

FINDING NO. 11;

Peter Paul Prierfs violin making school was

(2) blocks

from

GEM

Transcript at 262, 354.

STATE'S

office

in Salt

Lake City.

GEM STATE general counsel stated someone

should have walked over to Peter Paul Prierfs and personally
inspected the books (Transcript at 456, 477) .

GEM STATE had the

authority in its master policy to inspect the books of Peter Paul
Prier any time it wanted during normal business hours (Transcript
at 296).
FINDING NO. 12;
FINDING NO. 13;

Statement of Facts GEM STATE #3.
At no time before the cancellation of the

insurance by GEM STATE did anyone from GEM STATE ever request of
RON HORTONfs W-2 form.

Transcript at 99.

Carolyn Ivie an employee of GEM STATE was in charge of
investigating eligibility of RON HORTON (Transcript at 350)•

She

stated that in the 6 to 7 months GEM STATE took to investigate this
matter from March 1986 to September 1986 GEM STATE pre-authorized
the Pain Clinic services, then they denied them.

Transcript at

75-77, Addendum 4.
RON HORTON had to work 1,000 hours per year to be eligible
for his policy according to GEM STATE'S master policy that governed
Peter Paul Prier's health insurance, according to Carolyn Ivie.
4

Transcript at 246-249.

The master policy governs the conduct but

they do not give the master policy to the employees (HORTON) or to
the employer (Peter Paul Prier).

Transcript at 251.

She stated

that many of the policy provisions are left out of the booklets
that are given to the employer employee, but the trust agreement
is the bible GEM STATE goes by.

Her job was to find out whether

RON HORTON was eligible according to the master policy. Transcript
at 97-98, 251-252.
Mr. Jeff Garbardi, GEM STATE'S general counsel testified that
the number of hours Mr. HORTON worked was never at issue (unlike
Carolyn Ivie's testimony heretofore set forth) only whether or not
he was employed by Peter Paul Prier. Testimony at 456. RON HORTON
testified that at no time was he ever informed by anyone at GEM
STATE that the only issue they were concerned about is whether or
not he was employed by Peter Paul Prier.

Transcript at 492, 97-

98.
On about June 3, 1986, GEM STATE wrote to RON HORTON and told
him GEM STATE did not cover plain clinics (Addendum 4).
In September, 1986, seven (7) months after the medical bills
had been received by GEM STATE, they still wanted evidence that
HORTON had been working 1,000 hours. Mrs. Ivie testified that she
did not know if anyone had ever asked Mr. HORTON for evidence that
he had worked 1,000 hours.

Transcript at 332-333.

Carolyn Ivie

could not determine the amount of hours RON HORTON worked by
looking at his check stubs when she received them.

Mrs. Ivie

herself is a monthly salaried employee and there is nothing on her
5

payroll check indicating how many hours she worked per month.
Transcript at 272-273. RON HORTONfs eligibility had been misjudged
by the 1,000 hour rule for seven (7) months.
FINDING NO. 14:

Transcript at 309.

Failure to pay his medical bills finally

began to get Mr. HORTON down.

The stress and pain returned after

the notice of the cancellation of the insurance in September 1986.
Mr. HORTON returned to the Pain Clinic for treatment.
missing work because of his condition.
104.

He began

Transcript at 69/ 78, 103-

The Pain Clinic again commenced giving him stellate ganglion

blocks and trigger point injections.

These shots were done with

long needles and were very painful.

These shots were used to

disrupt the transmission of pain within the body.

Transcript at

110.
FINDING NO. 15: RON HORTON made every effort to get GEM STATE
to pay the bill because their failure to pay was slowly causing him
to regress from his successful treatment at the Pain Clinic and
thus not be able to get back to conducting. He went to GEM STATE'S
office or called them at least 6 to 10 times and almost every time
was told to speak to someone different.

Each time he got a

different response as to what he needed to satisfy GEM STATE.

He

would often leave messages and they would take some considerable
time in returning his calls. Transcript at 92, 94-96.
GEM STATE told RON HORTON in mid-summer of 1986, four (4)
months after the medical bills had been received by GEM STATE, that
he had to be working 1,000 hours per year.

Mr. HORTON told GEM

STATE he did not have time cards and kept no records of his hours
6

and that he was a monthly salaried employee. He went to Peter Paul
Prier to see what he could do to get the matter resolved.

Mr.

HORTON was never reluctant to turn over any thing that he could
think of to be helpful to GEM STATE since he wanted to get these
bills paid. Transcript at 97-98.
Mr. HORTON has never run a business and is not familiar with
business records.

Peter Paul Prier made his employee pay checks

out by hand and was very unsophisticated in his business practices.
Peter Paul Prier was not computerized and there was no stub on the
paycheck.

Transcript at 100-101.

RON HORTON asked Peter Paul Prier to send payroll records,
Mr. Prier responded
Addendum 1 & 2.
businesses.

that he had

sent them two

(2) letters.

GEM STATE specializes in small unsophisticated

GEM STATE did not, at any time, tell Peter Paul Prier

why his two

(2) letters

(Addendum 1 & 2) were unacceptable.

Transcript at 268-269.
GEM STATE'S general counsel testified he thought he should
have walked over (2 blocks away) to Peter Paul Prier's office
personally and talk to Mr. Prier in light of what he has learned.
He also testified that he likely should have asked Mr. HORTON for
his W-2 forms.

Transcript at 477, 456, 262, 296.

The contract between Peter Paul Prier and GEM STATE allows GEM
STATE to go to Peter Paul Prierfs at any time during working hours
and inspect their payroll records.

Transcript at 29 6.

Mrs. Ivie testified that GEM STATE did not complete their
investigation in 45-days.

Transcript at 540.
7

She testified that

RON HORTON should have been notified within twenty (20) days of the
acceptance or denial of his claim. GEM STATE is bound by the State
Regulations regulating the handling of insurance claims (These are
set forth hereinafter).

Transcript at 322-323.

Mr. HORTON reckoned he worked an average of 28-1/2 hours per
week with some weeks more and some weeks less.

Transcript at 98#

Addendum 3.
FINDING NO. 17; 17(d) Mr. HORTONfs professional standing has
been adversely impacted by his absence from conducting in the world
of music.

Gerald Ottley, conductor of the Tabernacle

Choir

testified that in the music world it takes a long apprenticeship.
Both a performer and a conductor must make themselves visible and
keep themselves visible if they are going to retain employment.
Potential employment opportunities always asked what have you done
lately?
skilled

Transcript at 224-225.
conductor

of ballet.

Mr. HORTON is a particularly
He understands

understands the music of ballet.

ballet

and

he

Had this incident not occurred,

he would have been very well-established nation-wide as a conductor
making a substantial living. Transcript at 222-223. Gerald Ottley
considers RON HORTON was underemployed, at Peter Paul Prier's.
Transcript at 227.
Harold Lundstrom, Music Critic of the Deseret News for 20
years, rated RON HORTON by all odds the very best conductor of
Ballet West has ever had and the best ballet conductor he has ever
seen in Utah. Mr. Lundstrom was on the ballet board and the opera
board. Transcript at 227-234. He stated that in 1983, he was tops
8

among the young conductors in the west.

It is one thing to be out

of conducting for 3 years, but to be out of conducting for 5 years
Mr. Lundstrom indicated you almost have to start from scratch.
Transcript at 236-277.

Mr. HORTON testified that he had in the

2-year period while he was having his relapse he had inquiries from
the Royal Ballet and the Buffalo Philharmonic. There are many lost
opportunities

and

recovered timely.

opportunities he could have
Transcript at 213# 215.

sought had

he

Mr. HORTON testified

that because conducting is a very competitive business they book
conductors way in advance.

I could not commit myself because of

my declining health problems as a result of my unpaid bills.
Transcript at 216, 197-200.

ARGUMENT SUMMARY
It is argued that GEM STATE did not diligently investigate the
facts or fairly evaluate and consider the information provided them
by Mr. HORTON and Peter Paul Prier. Nor did they act promptly and
reasonably in either rejecting or settling the claim.
GEM STATE failed to stand by the fact that they pre-authorized
the University of Utah Medical Center's Pain Clinic to pay onehalf (1/2) of the medical bills of RON HORTONfs stay.

GEM STATE

then spent seven (7) months trying to find a way to avoid honoring
that commitment.

Further, the agent who sold the policy to Peter

Paul Prier confirmed that RON HORTON would be covered after the
nine (9) month waiting period.

9

It is argued that several of GEM STATE'S employees who dealt
with RON HORTON had a different eligibility requirement which they
were holding him to.

Some said he needed 1,000 hours per year to

be a full-time employee, some full-time, and some saying they only
needed evidence that he was actually employed.
If it is found by this Court that there are none or only one
of the many issues raised by GEM STATE in this appeal have merit,
then RON HORTON asks for his attorney's fees in defending this
appeal for the issues, if any there be, that are found to be
frivolous.

ARGUMENT
GEM STATE PRE-AUTHORIZED RON HORTON1S BILLS
It is a well-settled principal of law that
In accordance with the agency principals, a
corporation is bound by the knowledge acquired
by, or notice as given to, its officers or
agents within actual or apparent scope of
their authority or employment and in reference
to the matter to which their authority or
employment extends. 18B Am.Jur.2d 1671.
In this case GEM STATE'S employee pre-authorized the Pain
Clinic's bills for RON HORTON prior to his entering the hospital
bound GEM STATE (see Addendum 1) . All that occurred for seven (7)
months thereafter was harassment, plain and simple. Transcript at
60-66, 368-381.
In the case of Allstate Insurance Co. v. State Farm Automobile
Insurance Co., 679 P.2d 879 (Oregon 1983) the Court said,
An insured may be estopped from denying coverage when the party claiming coverage has acted
10

in reasonable reliance on the agent representation of coverage that is not patently absurd.
(Citations omitted).
In the Allstate case, supra, an agent concluded that the
insurer was entitled to rely on the agent's representation and
the insurance company was estopped from asserting a contrary
interpretation of the policy.
In Nolden v. Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Co., 259 NW.2d 75
(Wis. 1977) the Court said,
The physicians had recommended open heart
surgery. According to Greenwood, Nolden was
concerned as to whether or not the company
would pay the benefits of the hospital bills
that he was going to have if he went on for
surgery. Greenwood expressed the opinion that
the company would probably continue to pay as
it had on several earlier bills. The record
does not make clear the extent to which the
heart surgery elective. Greenwood's testimony
indicates, however, that Nolden had some
element of choice, if only as to the timing of
the surgery, and chose to proceed relying on
the insurance coverage, this was a sufficient
reliance to estop the company from denying
coverage. (Id. 83).
The Utah Supreme Court has found in Microbiological Research
Corp. v. Muna. 625 P.2d 690 (Utah 1981):
A corporation, being once charged with notice
of the character of transaction, continues to
be affected by such notice, whatever changes
may occur in the personnel of its working
force. (Id. 695)
In Lowe v. April Industries. Inc., 531 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1974)
the court held, " . . . knowledge of the entity is imputed to it
from the knowledge possessed by its officers and agents." (Id.
1299) .

11

It would appear that GEM STATE was therefore estopped from
denying

their pre-authorization

authorization

and

upon which Mr. HORTON

are bound
and

by

their pre-

the hospital

relied

(Addendum 1).
Mark Anderson sold the GEM STATE policy to Peter Paul Prier
and interviewed RON HORTON.

RON HORTON told Mr. Anderson of the

specifics of his employment and told him about his prior accident
and his need of future medical treatment.
him he would be covered.

Mr. Anderson assured

These facts were never refuted at trial.

Transcript at 50-51.
In the case of Hit v. Cox, 737 Fed. Rptr. 2nd 420 (4th Cir.,
Court of Appeals, 1984) it says:
When an insurance company through its agent,
undertakes to advise an insured on the scope
of the insured's coverage, it is reasonable
per se for the insured to rely on the
company's representation.
A company which
purports to be expert in insurance matters and
which purports to presents his clients
interest cannot avoid the responsibility as
thus incurred by arguing in hindsight that an
insured cannot believe an insurance agent.
(Citations omitted).
What bad faith on the part of GEM STATE to not honor their own
letter pre-authorizing 50 percent of all RON HORTONfs medical bills
at the

Pain

Anderson.

Clinic

and

representations

Addendum 1.

12

of their

agent Mark

GEM STATE DID NOT ACT IN GOOD FAITH OR DEAL FAIRLY
WITH RON HORTON
Mr. HORTON contends that the Defendant GEM STATE did not act
in good faith in not paying the Plaintiff's medical claims.
At all times GEM STATE had the right to go to Peter Paul
Prier and inspect the books and never did so.
456, 262, 296# 354.

Transcript at 477,

The Defendant did not pay the claims of the

Plaintiff from March 1986 until September 1986. Statement of Facts
of Appellant #4 and #13.
In Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah
1985) Utah Supreme Court said:
The implied obligation of good faith performance contemplates, at the very least that the
insurer will diligently investigate the facts
to enable to determine whether the claim is
valid, will fairly evaluate the claim and
will, therefore, at promptly and reasonably in
rejecting or settling the claim (citations
omitted) (Id. 800) . . . Deal with laymen as
laymen and not as experts in the subtleties of
law and underwriting" and to refrain from
actions that will injure and that will enure
to the insureds ability to obtain the benefits
of the contract. (Citation omitted). These
performances are the essence of what the
insured has bargained and paid for, and the
insurer has the obligation to perform them.
When an insured has breached this duty he is
liable for damages suffered in consequence of
that breach. (Id. 801). (Emphasis added).
RON HORTON contends that GEM STATE did not:
1.

Diligently investigate the facts;

2.

Fairly evaluate and consider the information provided and did not act promptly
and reasonably in either rejecting or
settling the claim;

3.

Deal with the Plaintiff as a layman;
13

4.

Have a set standard to judge RON HORTON's
eligibility criteria.

5.

Stand by their pre-authorize procedure to
the University Hospital and then declined
to honor their own pre-authorization.

In Callioux v. Progressive Insurance Co. , 745 P.2d 838 (CA
Utah 1987) the court held that the insurance company was in good
faith in denying the claims because of the results of their own
investigation and an independent arson expert, and the State Fire
Marshall all concluded the fire was caused from arson.

One major

difference in this case is that when the Plaintiff was acquitted
from criminal charges of arson and insurance fraud the company
immediately paid the full claim.

In the case at hand, GEM STATE

did not pay even after receiving Addendum

A

and Addendum B

(letters from RON HORTON's employer).
In Fletcher v. Western National Life Insurance Co., 89 Cal.
Rptr. 78 (1970), the bad faith interpretation of medical reports
concerning the insured's disability constituted the basic reason
for the insurer's attempt to cancel benefits due the insured.
In Silbera v. California Life Insurance Co., 113 Cal. Rptr.
711 (1974) the court held that under the circumstances of the
case, when the insurer interpreted the ambiguous provisions in the
policy in its favor and against the insured's interest, it acted
in bad faith as a matter of law.
In this case the confusion and ambiguity was over the interpretations

of various

officials

of GEM

STATE'S

of what

the

criteria was they were looking for as to whether he was covered or
not.

Some of GEM STATES employees wanted to know was he working
14

1,000 hours per year (Transcript at 309,332-333, 273-277); or
whether he was employed.

Transcript at 456.

In Williams v. First Colony Life Insurance Co., 593 P.2d 534
(Utah 1979) this case stands, amongst other things, for the proposition that the insurance carrier must act promptly and reasonably
in settling the claim.

It is contended in this case that taking

seven (7) months to deny the claim is not prompt or reasonable.
To that end, the Utah State Insurance Department has promulgated regulations entitled "The Unfair Claims Settlement Practice
Regulations".

See Addendum #6.

One thing is clear, that the procedures followed by GEM
STATE in this matter do not conform to the letter or spirit of
these regulations.

RON HORTON IS ENTITLED TO DAMAGES
In FINDINGS OF FACT 17(b), the Court awarded $3,500 for
medical expenses incurred after September 1, 1986, as a result of
the Plaintiff's relapse after GEM STATE'S denial of coverage of
RON HORTON.
It could well be argued that the $5,000 consequential damages
the Trial Court awarded are relatively low in light of problems
created for RON HORTON as a result of GEM STATE'S bad faith.
Clearly the damages were foreseeable. Stress is a major factor in
pain rehabilitation.

Transcript at 129-130.

In addition to all of the above, GEM STATE knew Plaintiff was
a professional music conductor and violinist that they undertook
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to

insure.

Therefore,

GEM

STATE

should

have

foreseen

the

emotional distress that might come upon a professional musician.
Transcript 25-26, 33.

FORESEEABILITY OF PAIN AND SUFFERING
FROM WITHHOLDING MEDICAL PAYMENTS
It is contended by the Plaintiff that it is foreseeable for
a health insurance company that its actions of denial of coverage
or timely delay of coverage could cause medical and psychological
problems to flare up in their covered insured as a result of their
actions.

Surely, above all the

insurance carriers' medical

insurance carriers deals with people's health problems and therefore these consequences are foreseeable.

Like a victim who has

had a heart attack and had to go through the stress of not having
future heart medical related services performed

and then has

another heart attack as a result of it, such would be foreseeable
by the insurance carrier.

That would be particularly so if there

was a wrongful denial of coverage.
This was borne out in Wilkins v. Grays Harbor Community
Hospital. 427 P.2d 716 (Wash. 1967), wherein the Oregon Court
said:
We are of the opinion that increased pain and
suffering and detrimental changes in one's
health are certainly a reasonable foreseeability from a breach of this medical service
contract by denying treatment under it. (Id.
722) . . .
We deem the evidence amply sufficient to
justify a conclusion by the jury that the
plaintiff had been permanently damaged as a
16

result of the defendant's breach of contract.
Furthermore, we are of the opinion that the
evidence with reference to damages is not
speculative or conjectural. (Id. 724)
Clearly, RON HORTON suffered a relapse and that relapse was
attributable to the failure of GEM STATE to pay the Pain Clinic for
his treatment.

Transcript at 69, 78, 103-104.

Both the $3,500 in medical expenses after the denial of
coverage (Findings of Pact 17(b), paragraph #13 of GEM STATE1s
Statement of Facts) and the $5,000 consequential damages (Findings
of Fact 17(d)) are clearly a result of pain and suffering, inconvenience and

loss of work opportunity

that were

extensively

testified to in trial without any rebuttal testimony being offered
by GEM STATE.

RON HORTON SEEKS ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR A BAD FAITH APPEAL
This is a case involving an insurance company's failing to pay
health insurance benefits of their insured.

It is a bad faith

case.
If the Court were to read the Statement of Facts of the
Appellant, and the Statement of Facts of the Respondent, the Court
might reasonably conclude that they were not talking about the same
case.

It would appear that there is a duty on the appellant to

fairly set out the facts of the case so the Court would not be
mislead as to its factual basis.

It would not appear that the

Respondent has a duty to repeat everything the Appellant said about
Appellant's case in the Statement of Facts, it would seem that the
Appellant has a duty to set those facts with accuracy so a Court
17

can understand the precise nature of the conflict.

(Rule 24 of the

Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, Mountain States Broadcasting
Co. v. Neale. 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989).
If a trier of fact hears all the evidence and concludes that
certain evidence is persuasive and the other evidence is not and
thereafter so rules, then the trier of fact should not be found
wanting. From the Respondent's Statement of Facts, there was ample
evidence presented that would allow the trial court to make a
determination in favor of RON HORTON and against GEM STATE.
The Courts seem to have had difficulty in defining what is a
"frivolous appeal11.
1978).

See, O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P. 2d 306 (CA Utah

Canyon Country Store v. Bracev, 112 Utah Advanced Reports

19 (1989).
One issue is whether the Statement of Facts of GEM STATE
mischaracterized and misstated the evidence presented by both
parties at the trial.

See, Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395 (CA-Utah

1987) .
The Appellant asserts over and over in their brief that the
"factual deficiencies in this litigation (of RON HORTON) allows
them to have attorney's fees awarded to them pursuant to Rule 3 3(a)
of the Rules of the Court of Appeals.
Brief.

Page 47 of Appellants

This Court would have to read the Statement of Facts and

make its own determination whether or not there were factual
deficiencies in the transcript which would not justify the trial
court acting as it did.
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In O'Brien v. Rush, supra, the Courts will hear the issue of
whether the appeal was taken frivolously or for delay.

It should

constitute common knowledge that to avoid payment of an insurance
claim leaves the money in the bank of the insurance company
accumulating interest and the medical providers of the insured
going unpaid.
Canyon Country Store v. Bracev. supra, tells us that by just
showing breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by
an insured does not show the bad faith necessary for an award of
attorney's fees under Section 78-27-56 of the Utah Code Ann. and
that is not the claim in this case. Our claim is —

the majority,

if not all, of this appeal was taken frivolously.
It is contended that for judicial economy and public policy
the appellate court should not be required to go through "frivolous
claims" to reach a valid claim. That issue was addressed in Morton
v. Allied Stores Corp.. 90 F.R.D. 352 (D. Colo. 1981).

That case

was focusing on the Colorado statutory counterpart to the Utah Bad
Faith Fee Statute.

In that case, the Court held that court's may

use their discretion when determining the amount of the attorney's
fees to be awarded.

In Morton, supra, the Colorado Federal

District Court determined that one of two claims asserted was
frivolous and therefore ordered an award of almost one-half of the
attorney's fees incurred in the defense of the suit.

If this

approach were followed by the Utah courts, it would likely make the
statute much more effective in saving the time of the court and
counsel. Each party would be encouraged to realistically evaluate
19

the merit of each claim for appeal and to appeal only the valid
claims or

defenses.

The attempts of the Appellant to argue that the law su-ports
their rendition of the facts that were testified to in cor -, is
clearly erroneous. Can an Appellant or Respondent simply r,-state
the evidence in their case and ignore the evidence

a their

opponent's case and then appeal based on the fact that the Court
did not accept their version of the facts.

Paragraphs like:

The only evidence Plaintiff put on at trial to
rebut GEM's defense of failure to mitigate
damages was his testimony that he did not
understand
the
information
GEM
wanted
(initially) and his employer was out of the
country in June of 1986.
Page 41 of the
Appellant's Brief.
This statement is clearly false and without merit and clearly
flies in the face of the facts stated in the Respondent's Statement
of Facts. We not only have issue of good faith and fair dealing,
but we have the issue of pre-authorization which was never rebutted
or denied as set forth in Addendum 1.

Can GEM STATE giving pre-

authorization not pay the claim and make RON HORTON go through a
trial and an appeal simply to get the original pre-authorization
adhered to.

Can an insurance company appeal a pre-authorization

for medical services and at the same time admit that they made the
pre-authorization?

Transcript 3 68-381.

AMBIGUITY IN GEM STATE'S POLICY OF INSURANCE
It is a rule of contract law in general, and of insurance law
in particular, that a written agreement should be construed against
20

the party who has drawn the instrument in the event that there is
doubt as to its meaning.

Sparks v. Republic National Life

Insurance Co.. 647 P.2d 1127 (Ariz. 1982) , Silberg v. California
Life Insurance, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1974).

It hardly would seem

reasonable that an insurer could take advantage of an ambiguity in
a policy to justify delay or refusal to make payment.

In the

Sparks case the Court states as follows:
Defendants were fully aware if the grievous
nature of Sparks' injuries and were further
aware that plaintiffs would be faced with
staggering medical bills upon termination of
benefits. Nonetheless, defendants decided to
deny any obligation to pay continuing benefits
to plaintiffs based upon patently ambiguous
and previously undisclosed provisions of the
insurance policy. These facts, in conjunction
with the trial court's determination that
defendants had breached their contract with
the plaintiffs, were sufficient to submit the
issues of bad faith to the jury.
The reason this helps an insurance company like GEM STATE and
harms a small individual like RON HORTON, seeking the comfort of
having health insurance, is simple.

When GEM STATE saw the word

"part-time" used in the GEM STATE'S Addendum 2, they used that
ambiguous language to not make payments for seven (7) months and
thereafter.
The Plaintiff would therefore ask this Court to take judicial
notice of, that the word "full-time" does not mean 1,000 hours.
One thousand hours per year is "part-time".

"Full-time" is 40

hours per week, 52 weeks per year, which equal 2,080 hours.
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THE COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED THE DOCUMENTS
CONTAINED IN GEM STATE1S ADDENDUM 7
RON HORTON sought all of the documents at GEM STATE pertaining
to his case,

GEM STATE'S effort to introduce documents in the

middle of the trial that had never been produced in pre-trial
discovery was properly denied by the Court.

(R 120).

First of all, the supplement to the responses of discovery
were not complete as to the time they were made. Rule 26(e) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The documents in Appellant's

Addendum 7 were in fact in existence at the offices of GEM STATE
at the time the Request for Production of Documents was made, and
they were not provided for inspection.
STATE'S Brief).

(See pages 21-22 of GEM

Interestingly, this was also true of RON HORTON's

Addendum 1 dealing with pre-authorization which was not provided
under discovery.

Fortunately Mr. HORTON

found that copy or

otherwise it likely never would have surfaced at trial. Transcript
at 378.
In this case, in the middle of a trial, after conflicting
testimony by Mr. HORTON and GEM STATE as to whether Appellant's
Addendum 7 had been sent or received, Appellant attempted to
introduce it. Respondent is unable to locate a Utah case requiring
the court to allow the introduction of documents, not forthcoming
in discovery, in the midst of a trial.
In any event, there is nothing contained in Exhibit 7 that
would have changed the outcome of the Court's decision.

It

contains a notice to RON HORTON in April of 1986 saying we have
22

sent for more information from the hospital and two

(2) form

letters to the hospital seeking additional information from the
Pain Clinic.
authorization.

Addendum 7 does not deal with the issue of preThe fact that these requests (Addendum 7 of GEM

STATE*s Brief) were made in April of 1986, does not answer the
question as to why it took GEM STATE until September to honor or
dishonor their pre-authorization.

Addendum 7 does not deal with

GEM STATE'S failure to diligently investigate the facts as to
whether RON HORTON was an employee or whether he was working 1,000
hours depending on which GEM STATE

employees were using whatever

criteria at the time.
In Tabat Chnick v. G.D. Searle & Co., 67 FRD 49 (D NJ 1975)
the Court noted that supplemental answers under Rule 2 6 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, given after jury selection, are
usually not timely.

C O N C L U S I O N
Wherefore, in light of the arguments and the facts set forth
from the trial transcript and prevailing statutory and case law,
RON HORTON respectfully requests this Court to sustain the lower
Court's conclusions that GEM STATE pre-authorized the medical
bills, breached its contract, and breached the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing with RON HORTON.
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Further, RON HORTON asks

that the Court award the damages awarded by the trial court and RON
HORTON's attorney's fees for defending this appeal.
DATED THIS

Q^^f day of November, 1989.

JOHJKPRESTON CREER
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

Xi

day of November, 1989, I

caused four (4) true and correct copies of the REPLY BRIEF OF THE
PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT RONALD M. HORTON to be hand delivered to the
following:

Jeffrey R. Oritt, Esq.
TIBBALS, HOWELL, MOXLEY & WILKINS
257 East 200 South, #850
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2048
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ADDENDUM # 1

GEM STATE MUTUAL OF UTAH
376 East 400 South • Suite 309 • P.O. Box 449
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 • (801) 521-7164

CLAIM NUM3ER 263200

EXPLANATION OF BENEFITS
PATIENT
SOCIAL SECURITY
DATE PROCESSED
PROCESSED BY

HORTON, RONALD MEAD
1325 COLONAIL CIRCLE
SLC, UT 84108

HORTON, RONALD MEA
529 58 1385
04 APR 1986
CWH

CS1673 - PETER PAUL PRIER, INC. DBA

CLAIM
PROVIDER AND
BENEFITS
HARE, BRADFORD D
MEDICAL VISITS
MEDICAL VISITS

S U M M A R Y
SUBMITTED AMOUNTS DEDUCTIBLE
AMOUNTS
EXPENSES ELIGIBLE

SERVICE
DATES
12/30
12/30

B E N E F I T

TOTAL
PAID

129. 00
60. 00

64. 50
30. 00

0. 00
0. 00

64. 50
30. 00

189. 00

94. 50

0. 00

94. 50

D E T E R M I N A T I O N

THIS IS AN ADJUSTMENT OF CLAIMS 2 4 9 3 1 9 AND 2 5 8 5 7 6

P A Y M E N T

S U M M A R Y

'RGVIDER

PAYEE

iARE, BRADFORD D

RONALD MEAD HORTGN ?-. HAR 146394

DRAFT

AMOUNT PAID
94. 50
94. 50

I N E L I G I B L E

C H A R G E S

1 PAID AT 5Q%. PER PRE-AUTHORIZATION ALL CLAIMS PERTAINING
?AIN CLINIC WILL BE PAID AT 507.
2 SEE ITEM 1

J

THE

ADDENDUM #2

Peter Paul Prier, Inc.
Luthier
SPECIALIZING IN STRING INSTRUMENTS

(Rare and Contemporary)
Phone 364-3651

308 East 2nd South

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

K/M
To Whom It May Concern:
Our payroll records show that Mr. Ronald M. Horton received a
salary of $850.00 per month, from October 1, 1985 to the present.

i^eter j^aul Prier
Pres.
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ADDENDUM #3

Peter Pauljrier, Inc.
Lathi er
SP-CAUZNG IN SKIING INSTRUMENTS
(RaraandCantetnoorarvi
2C3 Ssst 200 South
Sait Lake ClY, Utah 3^111

Jul'/ 17, 1236

-^.jifsx Services
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Sincerely

AUG 0 51225
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' "'' " ""EXHIBIT N O .

ADDENDUM #4

GEM STATE MUTUAL OF UTAH
376 East 400 South • Suite 309 # P.O. Box 449
Salt Lake City. Utah 34110 • (801)521-7164

June 3, 1986

Ronald Horton
1325 Colonial Circle
Salt Lake City, OT 34108
Insured:
Patient:
Policy :

Ronald Horton
Ronald Horton
CS1673 - Peter Prier, Inc.

Dear Mr. Horton,
As per our conversation on June 2, 1986, Pain Clinics are ineligible for
benefits. Progress notes and records have been received and I have agreed
to present them to the Review Committee. A few of the items that will be
reviewed in reference to your claim are leave of absence, education, stress
management, sleep management, health behavior, pain control, psychotherapy,
aroebics, drugs de-toxic, etc. Upon corrpletion of the review we will notify
you of the final decision made by the Review Cdnmittee.
^

It was a pleasure speaking with you and if you have any further questions,
please do not hesitate to contact me.
Sincerely,

Shirley^Sunderland
Claims Manager
SS/tj

ADDENDUM #5

MAR - 6 1989
^ALT UKE COUNTY
Oeputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RONALD M. HORTON,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
CIVIL NO. 870902090

vs.
GEM STATE MUTUAL OF UTAH
Defendant•

The above entitled matter came on for a non-jury trial,
Honorable Frank G. Noel presiding, on December 6, 7, and 12, 1988.
Plaintiff was represented by John Preston Creer and defendant, Gem
State Mutual of Utah ("Gem State") was represented by Jeffrey R.
Oritt.

The Court having heard and considered the evidence and the

arguments of counsel hereby makes and enters its Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law as follows:
1.

In December, 1983, Ron Horton suffered injuries from an

automobile accident.
2.

Ron Horton was employed by Peter Paul Prier as of

September, 1984.
3.

Peter Paul Prier obtained group health and life

insurance from Gem State through Inter-Mountain Employers Trust,

effective November 1, 1984. On February 16, 1986, Ron Horton
entered the University of Utah Medical Center Pain Clinic.

He

concluded his in-patient stay at the Pain Clinic on March 16,
1986.

His medical bills for his stay at the University of Utah

Medical Center Pain Clinic totaled $13,633.60.

The portion of that

amount to which he was entitled for medical expenses under Gem
State's policy of insurance totaled $8,254.80.
4.

On March 31, 1988, Gem State received the billings from

the University of Utah Pain Clinic for the plaintiff.
5.

Gem State sent plaintiff an explanation of benefits

sheet dated April 4, 1986, which noted that the medical expenses
set forth thereon where "paid at 50% for pre-authorization.

All

claims pertaining to Pain Clinic will be paid at 50%."
6.

On or about June 3, 1986, Gem State wrote to plaintiff,

noting that Pain Clinic expenses were not covered under his group
health insurance policy.
7.

On May 12, 1986, Gem State wrote Peter Paul Prier

seeking information verifying that Ron Horton was employed by Peter
Paul Prier.
8.

On May 14, 1986, Peter Paul Prier wrote to Gem State

advising Gem State that Ron Horton was employed and was on a
monthly salary.
9.

On July 17, 1986, Peter Paul Prier wrote a second letter

to Gem State confirming Ron Hortons full time employment,
specifically identifying the number of hours per week he worked and
explaining the nature of plaintiff's employment responsibilities
from September 19, 1985 through May, 1986.

10.

On August 15, 1986, Gem State wrote a second letter to

Peter Paul Prier requesting additional information including
payroll records.
11.

There is no evidence that anyone representing Gem State

ever requested an on-site inspection of Peter Paul Prier7s payroll
records, at Peter Paul Priers business establishment.
12.

On September 29, 1986, Gem State canceled Ron Horton's

policy refusing to make payment on any medical expenses incurred by
Mr. Horton.
13.

The Court finds based on the testimony of Gem States own

witnesses that the only issue addressed by them in their
investigation from May 2, 1986 to September 29f 1986, when the
policy was canceled was whether or not Ron Horton was employed by
Peter Paul Prier.
14.

The Court finds that Gem States cancellation of Mr.

Horton's coverage contributed to a relapse in his condition causing
additional medical expenses and other consequential damages
including the necessity of hiring an attorney to litigate his
rights under the policy.
15.

The Court finds that the defendant did not act

reasonably to adequately investigate and to promptly process and
pay the plaintiff's claims.
16.

The Court finds that the defendant breached its implied

contractual

covenant of good faith and fair dealing with the

plaintiff.

The Court finds that defendant's failure to pay the

insurance proceeds to the plaintiff prior to September of 1986, was
a breach of the express terms of plaintiff's contract with the
defendant.

17.

Plaintiff, VM.S damage-i by defendant's breaches as follows:
a.

8,254 for nodical expenses covered under the.
po.Ucy v>r.ior to the date of cancellation of
Frier's Group Health Insurance Policy on
September lf 1986.

b.

$3,500 for medical expenses incurred after
September 1, 1986 as a result of plaintiff's
relapse after defendant's denial of coverage,

c.

Attorney's fees in the amount of $15,000.

d.

Other consequential damages in the amount of
$5,000.

e.

Plaintiffs has incurred taxable cost in this
litigation in the amount of

f.

The Court finds no basis for defendants
counterclaim for attorney's fees.

The Court having entered it's Findings of Fact now makes and
enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court has jurisdiction over this matter.

2.

Venue was properly laid in this forum.

3.

Defendant's failure to pay health insurance benefits to

the plaintiff for medical expenses incurred between February 16,
1986 and August 31, 1986, was a breach of defendant's contract with
the plaintiff.
4.

Defendant breached its implied contractual covenant of

good faith and fair dealing with the plaintiff by failing to

adequately investigate and to properly process and pay plaintiff's
claims.
5.

Plaintiff is entitled to an award of damages in the

amount set forth in it's Findings of Fact.
6.

Plaintiff is awarded his costs as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Dr. John Heil, Witness fee
Dr. John Heil, Air Fare
Filing fee
Jury Demand

5.

Service of Process

$750.00
996.00
75.00
50.00
9.80

TOTAL

$1,880.80

7.

Attorney's fees in the amount of $15,000.

8.

Defendant's counterclaim for attorney's fees should be
.I

dismissed.
Dated this

(SJ

day of cEetertraxy, 1989.

^Lc
Frank G. Noel
District Court Judge

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, postage
prepaid, to the following, this

John Preston Creer
Jack L. Schoenhals
1200 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Jeffrey R. Oritt
TIBBALS, HOWELL, MOXLEY & WILKINS
Two Fifty Seven Towers, Suite 850
257 East 200 South - 2
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

day of February, 1989:

ADDENDUM #6

Utah State Insurance Department's "THE UNFAIR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICE REGULATIONS":
The purpose of this regulation is to respond
to the volume of complaints arising from
claims settlement practices by affirmatively
establishing standards of equity and good
faith to guide licensees in the settlement of
claims. (Emphasis added) . . .
E.
Failing to affirm or deny coverage of
claims within a reasonable time after proof of
loss statements have been completed and communicated to the company or its representative; (Emphasis added).
F. Not attempting in good faith to effectuate
prompt, fair and equitable settlements of
claims
in which
liability
has
become
reasonably clear; (Emphasis added).
G. Compelling insureds to institute litigation to recover amounts due under an insurance
policy by offering substantially less than the
amounts ultimately recovered in actions
brought by such insureds when claims or
demands have been made for amounts reasonably
similar to the amounts ultimately recovered;
(Emphasis added) . . .
N. Failing to promptly provide a reasonable
explanation of the basis, in the insurance
policy, the facts or the applicable law, for
denial of a claim or for the offer of a compromise settlement; (Emphasis added) . . .
Every insurer shall complete investigation of
a claim within forty-five (45) days after
notification of claim, unless such investigation cannot reasonably be completed within
such time. (R540-89-9) (Emphasis added).

